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FOOTLOOSE AND FANCY FREE? STATE AID AFTER BREXIT
Stephanie Switzer* There is a perception in certain quarters that EU state aid law acts as a barrier to the UK ability to pursue an effective industrial policy. Indeed, while the level of state aid provided by the UK is low, 1 members of the current UK government and L J C have framed the EU state aid regime as potentially limiting the UK B business.
2

T UK EU
Brexit will allow the UK to provide greater support to domestic industry.
3
This article evaluates to what extent, if any, Brexit could provide the UK with greater autonomy to grant state aid. Section A provides a brief overview of the current EU state aid regime. Section B examines possible UK state aid arrangements after Brexit. Section C discusses state aid in the context of a noBrexit and compares the state aid law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with that of the EU. Section D evaluates the extent to which WTO UK its domestic industry. Section E concludes.
A. THE EU STATE AID REGIME
The EU state aid regime is established in Articles 107 108 TFEU. 4 Pursuant to Article 107 (1) TFEU, state aid is the grant of governmental assistance which, distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or in the production of certain goods. T as it M " le with the internal market and hence prohibited.
While the EU state aid regime would appear to prohibit all types of state aid, it contains a number of exceptions. Under Article 107(2) TFEU, for example, certain types of state aid are deemed to be compatible with the internal market. These include, inter alia, assistance having a social character, granted to individual consumers as well as aid aimed at remediating damage caused by natural disasters. Furthermore, under Article 107(3), the Commission has discretion to determine that other categories of state aid are compatible The Commission exercises surveillance and supervisory control over state aid and States must notify it of any plans to implement new or alter existing state aid. 7 The grant of state aid without prior approval is unlawful.
8 Aid falling under a block exemption does not, however, require notification. Most, though by no means all, state aid is now covered by the General Block Exemption Regulation and does not require prior approval.
9 Certain other types of aid falling below a de minimis level are also exempt from notification.
10
The EU state aid regime has been extensively criticised. According to Peretz and Bacon, these criticisms largely fall into three categories: that the Commission has taken an unduly expansive view of what constitutes state aid; that Commission decisions at times lack transparency and economic rigour; and that the approval process for notified state aid is far from timely.
11 Such concerns were also expressed C G balance of competences review.
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B. STATE AID AFTER BREXIT
In the short term, the UK is expected to reproduce EU state aid rules as retained EU law. This is certainly the approach envisaged in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. 13 In the longer term, the shape of state aid disciplines in the UK will depend, at least in part, upon the nature of post-Brexit settlement between the UK and the EU-27. The European Council has underscored UK of state aid and competition law. 14 This concern is apt to result in the EU insisting that state aid provisions are inserted into any agreement with the UK.
15
5 Under Article 107 (3) (e) TFEU and Article 108 (2), third paragraph TFEU, the Council may extend the categories of aid which may be compatible with the internal market. 6 Council Regulation 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (GBER) OJ 2014 L187/1. 7 Article 108 (3) TFEU. 8 For a discussion of the procedures applicable to the investigation of such aid, see Bacon (n 4) ch 18. 9 Bacon (n 4) 153. Note, however, that a summary of the measure must still be forwarded to the Commission; GBER (n 6) para 5. In reviewing the range of potential deals between the UK and the EU-27, it appears unlikely the UK will pursue a deal with the EU based on membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). This would have largely retained the status quo for state aid within the UK albeit with key differences such as the EFTA Surveillance Authority performing the role of the Commission. Other potential models for a deal are possible and, indeed, have been discussed extensively in the literature. 16 However, the Brexit remains very real.
In the event of no deal, 17 the UK will continue to be bound by the rules of the WTO on subsidies. This is because the UK is a Member of the WTO and will remain so after Brexit. By dint of this, the UK is a party to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing M "CM which distort internationa 18 Accordingly, even under a no deal scenario, the UK autonomy in the area of state aid/subsidies post-Brexit will be subject to at least some constraint. The next section elucidates upon the key elements of the WTO SCM. Prohibited and actionable subsidies may also be dealt with unilaterally by the affected Member A 31 The SCM also sets out notification and transparency obligations owed by Members.
C. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND STATE AID
D. ANALYSIS OF THE WTO OPTION
As an existing WTO Member, the UK is currently required to abide by the SCM.
32 Post-Brexit, and in the event that it is no longer under the state aid supervisory infrastructure of the EU, the UK may want to introduce an oversight system to ensure compliance with its WTO subsidies obligations. 33 Such a system will invariably raise sensitive issues pertaining to devolution because the devolved administrations have extensive spending powers independent of the UK government. 34 Under the WTO legal regime, the UK is responsible for any acts of the devolved administrations in breach of the SCM. The case for a UK level system of control also connects to the desire to avoid subsidy races between different parts of the UK. There are, however, important distinctions between EU and WTO law. There is no distinction in EU law between actionable and prohibited subsidies. There is also no requirement, or indeed scope under WTO law, for prior approval of subsidies. Review of subsidies under WTO law is ex post and reliant on upon another WTO Member bringing enforcement action, whether unilaterally through the imposition of countervailing measures or multilaterally through the WTO dispute settlement system. More broadly, the WTO system is less interventionist in that it sets a higher bar than the EU to the finding of an (actionable) 39 The less interventionist nature of the WTO subsidies regime has led some commentators to claim WTO
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Indeed, Crafts argues that the UK government may consider such interventions necessary to address any UK e single market. 41 Previous UK administrations have not, however, performed particularly well when industrial policy and there is a high risk of capture and government failure in this regard.
42 Accordingly, pure self-interest is likely to dictate that the UK will implement a rigorous system of independent review of the grant of state aid/subsidies. 43 Moreover, while the enforcement system under the WTO SCM regime is undoubtedly laxer than that applicable to state aid under the EU, the plethora of subsidies disputes 44 which have been litigated at the WTO make it clear that the UK will not have free rein to subsidise domestic industry in the aftermath of Brexit. /uksala.org/bringing-state-aid-home-could-an-effective-domestic-state-aid-regime-bedevised-for-the-uk/. 
